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INTRODUCTION

A new modern gig economy has emerged as a result of technology–
based gig work in the twenty–first century.1 Technology–based gig work
companies are companies that “provide online platforms that match
consumers with workers for short–term tasks.”2 Within these technology–
based gig work companies are “transportation network companies,” which
are companies like Uber and Lyft, whose business model utilizes an online
application to connect passengers to drivers in a prearranged method for a
fee.3
The modern gig workforce refers to individuals that work with any
technology–based gig work companies. The size of the gig workforce in
the United States is approximately 59 million, with an estimated 2 million
working for transportation network companies like Uber and Lyft. 4 Of
these 2 million drivers, approximately 45% of drivers have achieved an
education level of high school diploma or less, approximately 77% of
drivers identify as male,5 and approximately 63% do not consider
themselves white, where 34% are Hispanic/Latino and Black/African
American. Studies have shown that drivers for application–based
transportation network companies earn below the city and/or state
mandated minimum wage.6
The modern gig economy’s employment classification is currently in
controversy—between independent contractor classification or traditional
employee classification—where gig companies strive to maintain the
independent contractor status and gig workers are pushing for traditional
employee status. Gig workers advocate for a traditional employee
1

Brandie P., The History of the Modern Gig Economy, WRITER ACCESS,
https://www.writeraccess.com/blog/the–history–of–the–modern–gig–economy/ (last
visited Feb. 26, 2021).
2
Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to
Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479, 480 (2016).
3
Transportation Network Company, INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE,
https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance–definitions/transportation–network–company–tnc
(last visited Apr. 12, 2021).
4
Melissa Berry, How Many Uber Drivers Are There?, RIDE SHARE GUY (Nov. 1, 2021),
https://therideshareguy.com/how–many–uber–drivers–are–there/ (last accessed Apr. 12,
2021).
5
Who Are Rideshare Drivers: A Demographic Breakdown of Rideshare Drivers in the
U.S., GRIDWISE (Aug. 19, 2020), https://gridwise.io/who–are–rideshare–drivers–a–
demographic–breakdown–of–rideshare–drivers–in–the–u–s.
6
Frank Manzo IV & Robert Bruno, On–Demand Workers, Sub–Minimum Wages,
ILLINOIS ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE (Jan. 19, 2021), http://publish.illinois.edu/project
formiddleclassrenewal/files/2021/01/ILEPI–PMCR–On–Demand–Workers–Sub–
Minimum–Wages–FINAL.pdf (quoting Lisa Xu & Mark Erlich, Economic Consequences
of Misclassification in the State of Washington, HARVARD LABOR AND WORKLIFE PROGRAM
(Dec. 2019), https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/files /lwp/files/wa_study_dec_2019_final.pdf)).
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classification because the independent contractor classification has made
working conditions worse for gig workers. As a result, gig workers seek
employment protections to give them a basic minimum above what they
currently have, including: the ability to earn enough income to live a
relatively comfortable life, fair and dignified treatment, the ability to
bargain collectively, and increased worker protections. Gig companies
strive to maintain the independent contractor status because this
classification enables companies to avoid compliance with labor
regulations and protections.7 If gig companies were to classify
independent contractors as employees, its business structure would need
to support social security payments, unemployment insurance payments,
health care benefits, and tax withholding payments, to name just a few.8
Thus, gig companies pursue the independent contractor status, maintaining
that they are technology companies and denying the workers the
traditional employee status by claiming that their business model gives
workers freedom in these positions.9 This classification controversy is
producing significant, fierce litigation. This significant and fierce
litigation is based on the issue known as misclassification—where gig
workers are alleging the companies are misclassifying them as
independent contractors instead of employees.10 It is emerging as a
significant matter because of its public policy implications, where gig
workers are being denied basic life entitlements such as a livable wage and
worker protections.11
This aim of this comment is to critique and analyze existing and
proposed approaches to the gig economy employment status through state
legislation of transportation network companies (“TNC’s”). Evaluation of
two different approaches—gig workers as independent contractors
through states’ ABC test legislation, and gig workers as carved out of this
classification through Proposition 22—reveals that the legislations’
employment classification tests are inadequate. The existing legislation to
the gig economy employment classification is inadequate because it has
not resulted in a stable rule for transportation network company workers’
classification. Courts across different jurisdictions are interpreting existing

7

Id. at 481.
Employment Law: Employee vs. Independent Contractor, LAW SHELF, https://
lawshelf.com/shortvideoscontentview/employment–law–employee–vs–independent–
contractor/(last visited Apr. 12, 2021).
9
Bruno, supra note 6, at 481.
10
Lisa Xu & Mark Erlich, Economic Consequences of Misclassification in the State of
Washington, HARVARD LABOR AND WORKLIFE PROGRAM (Dec. 2019), https://lwp.law.
harvard.edu/files /lwp/files/wa_study_dec_2019_final.pdf.
11
Id. at 4.
8
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state legislation and yielding “indeterminate results.”12 These
interpretations are the result of misclassification litigation. Thus, the
existing tests have not resulted in a stable rule for gig employment
classification. Ultimately, a model approach is proposed—a federal
legislation comprised of an ABC test. This legislation will focus
specifically on transport, and only on wage and hour law, to ensure a
pragmatic, feasible, and stable employment test for gig workers within this
sub–section of the industry. The federal ABC test will be an element–
based test, as opposed to a balancing test, to minimize judicial discretion,
and produce a stable rule for gig workers engaged in transportation
network companies.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Introduction of Transportation Network Companies

The modern gig economy emerged at the end of the last century with
the introduction of technological applications facilitating transactions. The
gig economy is comprised of three components: (1) independent workers
paid by the ‘gig,’ which is a task or project; (2) consumers who need a
particular service; and (3) companies that connect the consumer to the
worker.13 A gig worker is an individual that pursues income–earning
activities outside of the traditional employment relationships of employee
and employer.14 This type of alternative work arrangement can take the
form of freelancing, temporary agency work, self–employment, and
subcontracted work.15 The legal classification of gig workers is as an
independent contractor; however, this legal classification has been
challenged.16
The gig economy is comprised of a variety of industries. The
technology companies that are focused on transportation, specifically
Uber and Lyft, are referred to in legislation as Transportation Network
Companies.17 Uber was founded in March 2009, with its first ever ride in

12

Keith Cunningham–Parmeter, Gig–Dependence: Finding the Real Independent
Contractors of Platform Work, 39 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 379, 379 (2019).
13
Emilia Istrate & Jonathan Harris, The Future of Work – The Rise of the Gig Economy,
NACO COUNTIES FUTURES LAB (Nov. 2017), https://www.naco.org/featured–resources/
future–work–rise–gig–economy.
14
What is a Gig Worker?, GIG ECONOMY DATA HUB, https://www.gigeconomydata.org
/basics/what–gig–worker (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Dave Baron, When Ridesharing Comes to Main Street, 105 ILL. B.J. 1, 2 (2017).
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July of 2010.18 In April of 2015, Uber launched UberEats.19 Lyft was
founded in 2007, as a side project for another company, and its application
launched officially in 2012.20 As of Fiscal Year 2019, Uber had five
million drivers globally,21 an increase from 3.9 million drivers in
December 2018.22 In the United States, there are approximately one
million drivers.23 Similarly, Lyft has 1.5 million drivers globally, and
700,000 drivers in the United States. 24 Ultimately, this rapid growth of the
gig economy can be attributed to the offline and online intermediaries that
have been introduced.25
The modern gig economy has experienced rapid growth over the last
twenty years.26 The American Action Forum found that the gig economy
workers’ employment rate surpassed the increased rate of total
employment.27 Specifically, in the transportation sector, “[o]n average, in
metropolitan areas the total average annual growths of establishments and
receipts in the transportation sector were 7.7 percent and 9.4 percent
respectively prior to the introduction of a ridesharing service, and 39.3
percent and 20.4 percent, respectively, in the years after the introduction
of a ridesharing service.”28 Another study, from the National Bureau of
18

The History of Uber, UBER NEWSROOM, https://www.uber.com/newsroom/history/
(last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
19
Id.
20
Ippei Takahashi, Lyft has been around longer than Uber. History Lesson., RIDEGURU
(last visited Feb. 26, 2021), https://ride.guru/lounge/p/lyft–has–been–around–longer–than
–uber–history–lesson.
21
UBER, 2020 INVESTOR PRESENTATION (2020), https://s23.q4cdn.com/407969754/files
/doc_financials/2019/sr/InvestorPresentation_2020_Feb13.pdf.
22
The History of Uber, UBER NEWSROOM, https://www.uber.com/newsroom/history/(last
visited Feb. 26, 2021).
23
Melissa Berry, How Many Uber Drivers Are There?, RIDE SHARE GUY (NOV. 1, 2021),
https://therideshareguy.com/how–many–uber–drivers–are–there/.
24
How Many Licensed Drivers Are There in the US?, HEDGES & COMPANY,
https://hedgescompany.com/blog/2018/10/number–of–licensed–drivers–usa/(last visited
Feb. 26, 2021)
25
Lawrence Katz & Alan Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work
Arrangements in the United States, 1995–2015, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
RESEARCH (Sept. 2016), https://www.nber.org/system /files/working_papers/w22667/
w22667.pdf?utm_campaign=PANTHEON_STRIPPED&amp%3Butm_medium=PANTH
EON_STRIPPED&amp%3Butm_source=PANTHEON_STRIPPED.
26
Ben Gitis ET AL. , The Gig Economy: Research and Policy Implications of Regional,
Economic, and Demographic Trends, AMERICAN ACTION FORUM 15–16 (2017),
https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/gig–economy–research–policy–
implications–regional–economic–demographic–trends/ (citing the American Action
forum, based on the University of Chicago’s General Social Survey, found that from 2002
to 2014, even though total employment increased by 7.5%, “gig economy workers
increased by between 9.4% and 15%.”).
27
Id.
28
Id.
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Economic Research, determined there was a 5% increase of workers
engaged in alternative work arrangements from 2005 to 2015.29 More
specifically, gig workers that provide their services through online
platforms accounted for 0.5% of all workers in 2015.30

B.
What is the Transportation Network Company business
model?
Gig economy companies, specifically the technology platform
companies, all have some form of the following characteristics: (1)
facilitating direct transactions between the consumer and producer, (2)
providing flexible work schedules for gig workers, (3) online payment
methods, for which the companies take a portion, and (4) online profiles
and reviews of both producers and consumers.31
The transportation network companies, specifically Uber and Lyft,
have a business model that centers on an internet–based app created by an
intermediary that matches customers to workers who will perform
personal services.32 Focusing on the ridesharing branch of Uber and Lyft,
both operate by connecting drivers and passengers. Passengers generate
demand, while the drivers perform as the supplier, and the application is
the facilitator of the transaction.33 The passenger then pays for the driver
through the application and Uber transfers this payment, less a commission
fee, to the driver.34 Several distinct features of the transportation network
companies’ business model include (1) that the internet–based application
pre–arranges the payment between the passenger and driver, which
precludes direct negotiations between the driver and the passenger; (2) that
the internet–based application, acting as an intermediary, directly controls
the supply of drivers and customers as the application precludes
passengers and drivers from initiating direct contact, and vice versa; and
(3) that the internet–based application supervises and terminates drivers
from the platform.
Focusing on the obligations of the driver to the company, there is a
contract by which drivers must adhere to in order to work with the
company. The contractual terms between the companies and the drivers
29

Katz & Krueger, supra note 25, at 7.
Id. at 3.
31
Istrate & Harris, supra note 13.
32
Seth Harris & Alan Kreuger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty–
First Century Work: The “Independent Worker,” THE HAMILTON PROJECT (2015), https:
//www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_centur
y_work_krueger_harris.pdf.
33
Nitin Lahoti, Uber Business Model Explained: From Start to Finish, MOBISOFT (Jan.
2, 2019), https://mobisoftinfotech.com/resources/blog/uber–business–model–explained/.
34
Id.
30
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are what has led to significant litigation. Both Uber and Lyft “explicitly
state that drivers are independent contractors rather than employees.”35
Uber’s contractual terms with its drivers are incredibly detailed. Prior to
partnering with Uber, drivers are required to upload their driver’s license,
car registration and insurance, pass a background check, pass a “city
knowledge test,” and “be interviewed by Uber.”36 Moreover, the day–to–
day conduct is also somewhat controlled. Uber requires drivers to send
client messages upon arrival to the pickup location, dress professionally,
play a neutral radio station, and open the door for the passenger.37 Uber
also requests passengers to rate and provide written feedback of their
drivers. Uber “uses these ratings and feedback to monitor drivers and to
discipline or terminate them,” and it “regularly terminates the accounts of
drivers who do not perform up to Uber’s standards.”38 Lyft’s contractual
terms with its drivers are less detailed than Ubers’, however, it imposes
similar standards.39 Their contracts require the drivers car to be clean, for
the drivers to ask passengers about a preferred route, prohibits drivers from
talking on the phone, and prohibits drivers from asking personal
information.40 Like Uber, Lyft also reserves the right to terminate drivers
if reports indicate the drivers are failing to comply with Lyft’s contractual
policies.41 Although the contractual provisions seem pervasively
controlling, the companies maintain the employment legal status of their
drivers is that of independent contractors.

C.

Employees’ Rights

When a worker is considered an employee, the worker is not free from
the company’s direction or control. As an employee, the worker enjoys a
considerable amount of protections and benefits in comparison to their
independent contractor counterpart.42 Employees at businesses are
protected by labor laws that include a federal minimum wage, the right to
organize collectively, and workplace health and safety protections. 43

35

Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to
Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV 479, 490 (2016) (citing Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp.
3d 1067, 1070 (2015)).
36
Id. at 491.
37
Id.
38
Id. (citing O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1143 (N.D. Ca.
2015)).
39
Id. at 491 (citing Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1072–1073).
40
Id. at 491 (citing Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1072–1073).
41
Id. (citing Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1072–1073).
42
Id. at 486.
43
Murray, Brown, DeLauro Introduce Landmark Bill Expanding Labor Laws to Protect
Workers, U.S SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR & PENSIONS (Sept. 24,
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Moreover, if an employer interferes or violates any of these laws, the
employers can be held legally liable.44
When a worker is considered an independent contractor, the worker is
free from the company’s direction or control. However, as an independent
contractor, workers do not have access and are not entitled to certain
workplace protections that traditional employees are. Independent
contractors “lose protection to basic labor standards, including minimum
wage laws, overtime pay laws, paid family and medical leave policies,
workers’ compensation coverage, and unemployment insurance
benefits.”45 More specifically, independent contractors are not protected
by Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Title VII, labor law,
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), worker compensation laws, state
unemployment insurance, and receive no federal paid sick leave.46
Companies are incentivized to classify their workers as independent
contractors for several reasons.47 By classifying workers as an independent
contractors, employers save a substantial amount of money—federal and
state tax payments are eliminated, benefits are the responsibility of the
contractor, and workers compensation premiums are not applicable.48 The
Bureau of Labor Statistics calculated that the average benefits for the
“legally mandated and optional—for private sector workers make up
30.3% percent of total compensation.”49 Eliminating that benefit payment
is perhaps the most cost–efficient measure an employer can make.50 As
such, companies have been restructuring their business to avoid the legally
recognized employment relationship, which means avoiding payments,
increasing profits, and shifting responsibility to workers.51

D.

Employment Legal Tests

There are two categories of workers in the United States labor,
employment, and tax schemes, namely employees and independent
contractors. In order to determine what category a worker falls in, there
are specified tests that evaluate the parties’ relationships through a factual
2019), https://www.help.senate.gov/ranking/ newsroom/press/–murray–brown–delauro–
introduce–landmark–bill–expanding–labor–laws–to–protect–workers–.
44
Id.
45
Bruno & Manzo, supra note 6, at 1.
46
Jean Murray, Independent Contractor Laws and Regulations: What Employers Need
to Know, THE BALANCE SMALL BUSINESS (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.thebalancesmb.
com/laws–and–regulations–affecting–independent–contractors–398603.
47
Mark Erlich, 1099 Nation Spreads its Tentacles, COMMONWEALTH (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://commonwealthmagazine.org/economy/1099–nation–spreads–its–tentacles/.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
U.S. SEN. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDU., LABOR, & PENSON, supra at note 43.
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elements list.52 There is a control test to determine an employee and a
separate independent contracting test to determine who constitutes
independent contractors; both are rooted in agency law and both are
supplemented with federal and state legislation that provides further
contours of a worker.53
Under the common law of agency, the control test “defines an
employment relationship as a relationship of control: the employer gives
orders, plans out jobs in minute detail, and monitors the employee’s
performance.”54 The multiple factual elements considered are the workers’
skill level, the duration of this relationship, the payment method during the
relationship, and the ability of the employer to discontinue the worker
relationship.55 The independent contracting test, is where “the principal in
such a relationship asks a contractor to complete particular tasks, but
typically has neither the ability nor the desire to supervise that work
because it requires such specialized skill.56
Under federal and state legislation, employment is defined more
broadly. The federal Fair Labor and Standards Act discarded the control
test, and defined “employ” as “suffer or permit to work.”57 State
legislation, for example, in California, creates a presumption that “anyone
providing services to a business is an employee, shifting the burden of
proof to the party seeking to avoid employment status.”58 In S.G. Borello
& Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial and Labor Relations, the Supreme
Court of California established a multi–factor test that aims to look beyond
the “strict, formal right of control:
(a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality,
the work is usually
done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without
supervision;
(c) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(d) whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(e) the length of time for which the services are to be performed; (f)
the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
52

Rogers, supra note 2, at 484.
Id. at 484–485.
54
Id. at 485.
55
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (Am. L. Inst. 1958)).
56
Id.
57
Id. (quoting Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 75–718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2012)).
58
Id. at 487.
53
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(g) whether or not the work is a part of
the regular business of the principal; and
(h) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship
of employer–employee.”
Even though these tests are meant to provide clarity as to which
category a worker is in, in application they provide little clarity as to what
an independent contractor engaged in the transportation network
companies is because judiciaries have interpreted this federal legislation
and its respective state legislation, which has resulted in varied reasoning
and conclusions. The California Supreme Court, specifically, has
interpreted these employment tests to “embrace a simplified standard—
the ABC test—to determine whether contemporary workers are
independent contractors.59 This new legal standard for classifying
independent contractors was developed in Dynamex Operations West, Inc.
v. Superior Court.60 In Dynamex, Charles Lee, an independent contractor
for the same–day courier Dynamex, filed a law suit alleging labor law
violations of wages, hours, and working conditions as a result of the
independent contractor misclassification.61 The court held that any
individual is an employee, and not an independent contractor, if any one
of these conditions are met: (1) the employee exercises control over the
worker’s hours, wages, or working conditions; (2) the employee suffers,
or permits, the worker to work; and (3) the employer engages the worker,
thus creating an employment relationship.62 The court defined the second
prong by adopting the “ABC test,” which presumes that a worker in
California is a an employee unless all three of the conditions in the ABC
test are met.63 This new legal standard creates a presumption of
employment, and thus shifts the burden from the independent worker that
provides services, to the employer.
This is but one example of one the judiciary interpreting federal
legislation. Ultimately, the transportation network company business
model produces workers that have left the judiciaries interpreting federal
and/or state legislation, resulting in an unstable rule for transportation

59

Cunningham–Parmeter, supra note 12, at 383.
Kathleen Lucchesi, The Gig Economy, Classification in Session, LINCOLN DERR (Nov.
20, 2020), https://lincolnderr.com/employment–law–the–gig–economy–classification–in–
session/; See also Bruce Sarchet, Michael Lotito & James Paretti, Jr., AB 5: The Aftermath
of California’s Experiment to Eliminate Independent Contractors Offers a Cautionary Tale
to Other States, JD SUPRA, (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ab–5–
the–aftermath–of–california–s–40627/.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
60
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network company workers and leading to significant misclassification
litigation.

E.

Misclassification of Independent Contractors

Misclassification is the issue in which a company treats their workers
as independent contractors instead of employees.64 The consequences of
misclassification are voluminous for all parties. For federal and state
governments, they lose “substantial revenues from taxes that would have
been paid had the workers had been properly treated as employees. These
include income taxes and Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes . . .
as well as unemployment insurance taxes and payments into state–
administered workers’ compensation funds.” For businesses, those that
properly classify their employees, they operate at a “competitive
disadvantage” where they will either “lose work opportunities or feel the
pressure to sufficiently consider evading the law in order to compete on
what is no longer a level playing field.”65 For employees, they lose the
basic rights that regular employees are entitled to have, including “legal
entitlements to receive minimum wage, overtime payments, paid sick
leave, unemployment insurance, workers compensation insurance, anti–
discrimination protections, and the right to collectively bargain.66
The proportion of employers that are misclassifying their workers is
increasing—from 5% in the 2008 fiscal year to 14.4% in the 2017 fiscal
year.67 In a study that identified the misclassification in Washington from
2013–2017, the study demonstrated that urban areas have a higher
probability of misclassification, along with the state losing $152 million
in unemployment taxes, the workers compensation system losing $268
million in unpaid premiums, the federal government losing $384 million
in income taxes, the federal government losing $299 million in payroll
taxes for Social Security and Medicare, the federal government losing $9
million in federal unemployment insurance, and, ultimately, all the
misclassified workers losing traditional employee protections.68
If courts were to determine that Uber misclassified its workers as
independent contractors and must classify them as employees, the
estimated financial amount Uber has evaded paying is $4.1 billion a year.69
64

Xu & Erlich, supra note 10, at 4.
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 5.
68
Id. at 5.
69
Stephen Gandel, Uber–nomics: Here’s What it Would Cost Uber to Pay its Drivers
as Employees, FORTUNE (Sept. 17, 2015) https://fortune.com/2015/09/17/ubernomics/
(showing that $4.1 billion a year is comprised of: (1) $2.6 billion in reimbursement for
miles, gas, and tolls; (2) $110.4 million in vacation and sick leave; (3) $72 million in
65
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The $4.1 billion a year is comprised of nearly $3 billion that Uber has
taken from its workers in unpaid expenses such as miles, gas, and tolls,
vacation and sick leave, and insurance premiums.70 The remaining $1
billion, approximately, is owed to states, specifically in unemployment,
workers compensation, and payroll taxes.71 Consequently, as a result of
the vast amounts owed by Uber, and other transportation network
companies alike, there is an insurmountable pressure on the classification
of transportation network company workers, which has resulted in
significant challenges to the way transportation network companies
classify their employees.

F.
Current Legal Landscape of Transportation Network
Companies
There are several landmark cases that define the current legal
landscape of the gig economy. These cases demonstrate a shift from
perpetuating that transportation network companies maintain the
independent contractor status of its workers, to considering a holistic
approach allowing juries to decide. For the aforementioned reasons, the
companies continue to pursue the independent contractor status of its
employees and, conversely, gig workers seek employment status.
In Razak v. Uber Technologies, a group of individuals in Pennsylvania
driving for UberBLACK as independent contractors sued Uber, alleging
they were misclassified and independent contractors and seeking
minimum wages and overtime pay.72 The Eastern district of Pennsylvania,
just like California and Florida already have, ruled that the drivers were in
fact independent contractors.73 The court looked at the amount of control
the company exercised over the drivers, specifically how there is some
control over safety and work standards, however, there was no control
when drivers could drive for other competitors, the drivers are capable of
making or losing profits, the drivers invested their own equipment, and the
drivers make their own hours.74 Nonetheless, a unanimous Third Circuit
vacated and remanded this District Court ruling, finding that a reasonable
juror could side with the drivers on key factual issues regarding worker

retirement plan; (4) $612 million in payroll taxes; (5) $512 million in workers
compensation; (6) $80.9 million in unemployment; and (7) $112 million in health
insurance).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Lucchesi, supra note 60.
73
Id.
74
Id.
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classification.75 The Third Circuit is the “first court of appeals decision to
address the classification of gig workers.”76
In Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, the Supreme Court interpreted
employee status under the FLSA. The Supreme Court held that the
determination of a relationship between an employee and a worker is not
dependent on isolated factors, but rather “upon the circumstances of the
whole activity.”77 In Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, the court found that
changes in the company contracts with its employees did not transform the
employees to independent contractors.78 Moreover, the court claimed that
“neither the presence nor absence of any particular factor is dispositive.” 79
Therefore, “courts should examine the circumstances of the whole
activity,” determining whether, “as a matter of economic reality, the
individuals are dependent upon the business to which they render
service.”80The current legal landscape of the gig economy demonstrates a
shift towards a holistic and fact specific determination to the issue of
classification.

III.

APPROACHES TO TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANY
WORKERS

Transportation Network Companies have struggled with the issue of
worker classification. Below are two different approaches to worker
classification currently in state legislation—transportation network
company workers as independent contractors and transportation network
company workers as exempt. Neither of these approaches are optimal
because each one either prioritizes business from an efficiency perspective
or prioritizes the worker from a public interest perspective. These varying
legislations result in an unstable rule for the transportation network
company workers’ classification because they are the subject of
misclassification litigation. Ultimately, a model approach has been
proposed consisting of a federal legislation incorproating an ABC test.
This legislation will focus specifically on transportation network
companies, and only on wage and hour law, to ensure a pragmatic,
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feasible, and stable employment test for gig workers within this sub–
section of the industry.

IV.

GIG WORKERS AS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

States have begun to take legislative action regarding the gig economy
employment status of the transportation network companies; specifically,
various states have redefined their independent contractor and employee
tests, known as ABC tests. The legislation has been crafted deliberately so
that transportation network companies may easily meet the new criteria to
establish their workers as independent contractors.

A.
Transportation Network Company Worker Favorable
Legislation
California adopted its ABC test from Dynamex Operations West, Inc.
v. Superior Court and codified this new legal standard in the legislation
known as Assembly Bill 5.81 Assembly Bill 5 adopted a test for whether a
worker is an independent contractor or an employee under the California
Labor Code.82 The “ABC” test states that an individual providing services
or labor for compensation “shall be considered an employee, rather than
an independent contractor, unless the ‘hiring entity’ demonstrates that all
of the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) the person is free from the control and direction of the
hiring entity in connection with the performance of the
work, both under the contract for the performance of the
work and in fact; (2) the person performs work that is
outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business;
and (3) the person is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, or business
of the same nature as that involved in the work
performed.”83
This legal standard creates a presumption of employment, and thus
shifts the burden from the independent worker that provides services, to
the employer. “This favorable legislation to workers, however, has since
been overturned with more favorable legislation to transportation network
companies.”84
81
82
83
84
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B.

Transportation Network Company Favorable Legislation
i. Florida Legislation

Florida passed HB 221—Transportation Network Companies Act—in
2017.85 This Act was the first of its kind and essentially ensured that ride–
sharing drivers will be classified as independent contractors.86 This Act
designates “drivers for ride–sharing companies in the . . . gig economy as
‘independent contractors’ as long as the ‘transportation network company’
meets four criteria that are currently met by Uber, Lyft, and other similar
companies.”87 Section 9 states:
“Limitation on Transportation Network Companies. – A
TNC Driver is an independent contractor and not an
employee of the TNC if all of the following conditions are
met: (a) The TNC does not unilaterally prescribe specific
hours during which the TNC driver must be logged on to
the TNC’s digital network. (b) The TNC does not prohibit
the TNC driver from using digital networks from other
TNCs. (c) The TNC does not restrict the TNC driver from
engaging in any other occupation or business. (d) The
TNC and the TNC driver agree in writing that the TNC
driver is an independent contractor with respect to the
TNC.”88
The Act also imposes minimum insurance requirements for
transportation network companies and transportation network company
drivers, a zero–tolerance policy on alcohol and drug use of drivers, non–
discrimination policies, and disability access.

1.

Disadvantages to Workers

The Transportation Network Companies Act has many disadvantages
for workers. First, gig workers are precluded from making any claims
under the state unemployment and workers’ compensation scheme. This
clause deprives gig workers of every avenue for potential relief because
85

TROUTMAN PEPPER, Limited Impact of New Florida Law Deeming Uber, Lyft, and
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there is no federal counterpart to those laws.89 Second, this Act preempts
local governments from imposing further requirements than the Act
purports, specifically prohibiting local governments from instituting taxes,
licensing requirements, and other restrictions.90This preemption, similar to
the Proposition 22 preemption, undercuts a feasible method where local
governments could have circumvented the state legislation to make it more
fair for gig workers of the transportation network companies. Third, and
most notably, classification of gig economy transportation workers
suppresses the earnings of gig workers and shifts their potential income to
the executives and shareholders of the transportation network
companies.91

2.

Advantages to Transportation Network Companies

The Transportation Network Companies Act has many advantages for
transportation network companies. Besides every disadvantage to the
worker being an advantage to the company in regard to efficiency and
profits, there are additional advantages. First, the bill preempts any local
ordinances or rules on transportation network companies and specifies that
state law will regulate transportation network companies.92 This is a
significant advantage because, as the legislation is already skewed towards
favoring the companies, it demonstrates that the State is unlikely to make
any unfavorable changes to such companies.
Second, this bill ultimately provides a ‘safe–harbor’ for transportation
network companies because it shields them from liability with respect to
misclassification of employees as independent contractors in Florida labor
and employment law.93 This liability extends to laws governing minimum
wages, workers compensation, workplace discrimination, and
unemployment.94
Ultimately, this legislation ensured that that transportation network
company drivers were deemed independent contractors and thereby
shielded the companies from challenging this classification. This
legislation prioritizes the business from an efficiency perspective because
transportation network companies no longer face legal liability for
misclassification and because they have no expenditures regarding worker
protections. This legislation does not prioritize the gig worker because it
89
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provides hardly any advantages. Thus, this legislation is not an effective
solution to address the gig economy workers and their classification.

ii. Illinois Legislation
Illinois passed the Transportation Network Providers Act in 2015. The
Transportation Network Providers Act focuses on transportation network
companies, defining them as any “entity operating in this State that uses a
digital network or software application service to connect passengers to
transportation network company services provided by transportation
network company drivers.”95 This Act designates that a transportation
network company “is not deemed to own, control, operate, or manage the
vehicles used by transportation network company drivers, and is not a
taxicab association or a for–hire vehicle owner.”96 The Act codifies that a
transportation network company driver is an independent contractor
because it acknowledges the transportation network company has no
ownership of the vehicle, does not control the vehicle, and does not
oversee the daily operations of the driver or the vehicle.97

1.

Disadvantages to Workers

The Transportation Network Providers Act has several disadvantages
for workers. First, and most notably, classification of gig economy
transportation workers suppresses the earnings of gig workers and shifts
their potential income to the executives and shareholders of the
transportation network companies.98 A study conducted in Chicago from
September 2019 to September 2020, with a sampling of 77,974 trips,
“suggests that the treatment of [transportation network company] drivers
as ‘independent contractors’ suppresses their earnings.”99 The study makes
the following two assumptions: (1) that transportation network companies
charge 20% of commission to the fares and company drivers keep the
remaining 80% and (2) that the weighted average per–mile costs for fuel,
maintenance and repair, and vehicle depreciation used is that of the
American Automobile Association.100 The results are that a transportation
network company driver in Chicago “earned $19.01 per hour in gross
income, before vehicle expenses and taxes in 2019” and earned $23.23 per
hour in gross income, before vehicle expenses and taxes in 2020. 101 This
95
96
97
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101

625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 57/5 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Manzo & Bruno supra note 6, at i.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7–8

2022]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

367

difference is artificially inflated due to “reduced traffic congestion” as a
result of the COVID–19 crisis.102 When this is accounted for, with the
typical traffic levels, a transportation network company driver would have
“earned an estimated $20.78 per hour in gross income, before vehicle
expenses and taxes, which is about 11% less than the actual estimates for
2020.”103 After accounting for these expenses in 2019, the average
transportation network company driver earned approximately $12.30 an
hour, which is below the $13 per hour minimum wage in Chicago in
2019.104 After accounting for these expenses in 2020, the average
transportation network company driver earned approximately $13.62 an
hour, which is below the $14 per hour minimum wage in Chicago in
2020.105 Evidently, an average transportation network company driver has
continued to fall below the legislated minimum wage as a result of their
independent contractor status.
Second, several municipalities in Illinois have enacted their own
ridesharing ordinances.106 The ridesharing ordinances span across
Chicago, Evanston, Bloomington, Normal, Springfield, Peoria, Rockford,
and Maywood.107 Several provisions in the ordinances negatively affect
workers, and other provisions shift the cost to the transportation network
company. Several municipalities augmented the qualifications for drivers,
specifically, that the minimum transportation network company driver age
is 21, drivers with three or more violations within the past two years are
prohibited, and forbid transportation network company drivers that have
certain criminal convictions, focused on drugs, prostitution, hate crimes,
and child pornography.108 These provisions in the ridesharing ordinances
are a disadvantage to workers because they are more stringent standards
than the Act itself, and it imposes heightened requirements on workers
who already are disadvantaged socially or economically.

2.

Advantages to Transportation Network Companies

Very few municipalities have supplemented the Act with ordinances
that affect the transportation network company financially. The
supplements only require transportation network companies to pay annual
fees—”a $1,500 license fee in Springfield, a $2,500 application fee in
Rockford, a $3,000 license fee in Peoria, and a $100 application fee and

102
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$3,000 license fee in Bloomington and Normal” 109—and to submit
detailed background checks, annual vehicle inspections with specific
standards, and limit the “surge” pricing when there are cases of municipal
emergencies.110 These fees and heightened standards only apply to the
municipalities that enacted these ordinances. Moreover, and most notably,
transportation network company drivers being classified as independent
contractors allows the company to circumvent applicable minimum wage
laws in the state.111 Ultimately, this legislation is favorable to
transportation network companies because it ensured that company drivers
were independent contractors, and left municipalities with the potential to
legislate heightened standards, if, and only if, they decided to.
The ‘ABC’ tests, as amended by states like Florida and Illinois, are
being crafted deliberately so that transportation network companies can
easily designate its workers as independent contractors. Nonetheless, the
legislation still imposes requirements for the transportation network
company workers. This type of legislation is not an effective solution to
address the gig economy workers because it varies from state to state and
results in continuous challenges to the classification. Thus, it is not
effective legislation because it does not provide a stable rule for
transportation network company workers.

V.

TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANY WORKERS
EXEMPTION

In an effort to circumvent federal, state, civil, and criminal liability,
transportation network companies are turning to legislation that would
exempt its workers them from regulations. California adopted this type of
legislation, known as Proposition 22. Proposition 22 was adopted after the
California Supreme developed a new legal standard for classifying
independent contractors in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior
Court and codified this new legal standard in the legislation known as
Assembly Bill 5.112 Assembly Bill 5, as aforementioned, created a
presumption of employment, where the worker is considered an employee
unless all conditions of the ABC test are satisfied.113 After the AB5 Bill,
Uber and Lyft began unsuccessfully pleading with the lawmakers to
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exempt them from this bill. 114 Uber and Lyft turned to the unions to seek
compromise because “[e]ven if California deemed these workers
employees, that wouldn’t give them unionization rights unless the federal
government agreed, and even if that happened, organizing at Uber or Lyft
promised to be a fight on the level of unionizing . . . .” 115 In 2019, Uber,
Lyft, DoorDash, and Instacart spent $200 million in campaigning for this
ballot measure.116 The AB5 Bill has since been overturned with the
passage of Proposition 22, which is the gig worker exemption legislation.
Proposition 22, passed on November 3, 2020, is a ballot measure that
exempts the gig economy from state labor law.117 Proposition 22
reinforces the independent contractor classification on app–based
rideshare and delivery drivers.118 This ballot measure overrode
California’s Assembly Bill 5 because it considered app–based drivers to
be independent contractors and not agents or employees.119 Under
Proposition 22,
“app–based drivers may be properly classified as
independent contractors if the hiring entity: (1) does not
unilaterally prescribe specific dates, times of day, or
minimum number of hours during which the driver must
perform services; (2) does not require the driver to accept
any specific service request or assignment as a condition
of maintaining access to the company’s application or
platform; (3) allows drivers to perform rideshare or
delivery services for any other company, including direct
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competitors; and (4) does not restrict the worker from
performing any other kind of lawful work.”120
Further, app–based drivers are defined as workers “who (a) provide
delivery services on an on–demand basis through a business’s online–
enabled application or platform or (b) use a personal vehicle to provide
prearranged transportation services for compensation via a business’s
online–enabled application or platform.”121
Despite reinforcing the independent contractor classification,
Proposition 22 provides certain benefits and protections. These benefits
and protections include: (1) a healthcare subsidy consistent with the
average contributions required under the Affordable Care Act (ACA); (2)
a new minimum earnings guarantee tied to 120 percent of minimum wage
with no maximum; (3) compensation for vehicle expenses; (4)
occupational accident insurance to cover on–the–job injuries; and (4)
protection against discrimination and sexual harassment.122

A.

Analysis of the Gig Worker Exemption

This app–based driver exemption appears to be a quid pro quo, where
the app–based companies maintain the independent contractor
classification and the independent contractors also obtain rights, but it is
not an overall fair compromise. Unfortunately, Uber and Lyft have been
reluctant to release trip earnings and data for their drivers, despite their
regulator, California Public Utilities Commission, pressing for data.123 As
such, there is very limited public data, but several analysts have made
predictions that this paper will rely on.

i. Disadvantage for Workers
Proposition 22 has several disadvantages for workers. First,
Proposition 22 limits the app–based drivers to “a set of sub–employee
alternative perks such as an ‘earnings guarantee’ that doesn’t count the
time or gas they burn waiting between trips.”124 The time the app–based
drivers wait, and the amount of gas the drivers expend are a significant
factor that drives down their hourly earnings. A study by Uber data analyst
Alison Stein estimates that the average, statewide driver pay is
120
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approximately $23 per hour, before any expenses.125 After expenses, the
study implies the hourly earnings are $10.65 per hour, which is well below
the California minimum wage of $13.00 per hour.126 A Lyft–
commissioned study by Tucker suggests that after expenses, Lyft drivers
earn approximately $20.00 per hour, but this does not include wait time.127
When waiting time is factored in, an average Lyft driver earns
approximately $13.40 per hour, yet the study further suggest after
including more expenses, this earnings is below the California minimum
wage as well.128 Under this ballot measure, application based drivers do
not make, not even close, to the minimum wage due to factors of waiting
time and gas that the application based companies either did not address
or desired to change.
Second, traditional employees in other fields are beginning to be
displaced with app–based drivers. In December 2020, a supermarket chain
based in California, Albertsons & Co., advised their employee delivery
drivers that they will be replaced by independent contractors.129 Hundreds
of Albertson’s delivery drivers will be replaced by DoorDash Inc. workers
as a result of their appn–based driver independent contractor status.130
Moreover, Albertsons & Co. claims this change “is happening in multiple
states to ‘help [Albertson’s] create a more efficient operation.’”131
Eventually, companies that have a multi–state operations will begin to
shift their workforce, where feasible, to independent contractors that are
exempt under Proposition 22. And after multi–state operations prove
successful, it will expand globally. Ubers’ CEO Dara Khosrowshahi stated
that the company will “‘more loudly advocate for laws like Prop 22’” and
make it a company priority to “‘work with governments across the U.S.
and the world to make this a reality.’”132
Third, Proposition 22 has prompted other types of companies that are
not app–based drivers to seek similar, independent contractor exemptions.
Specifically, Jyve Corp., a startup that sends its contractors to stock
shelves in the grocery stores, is seeking a similar exemption.133 In due
time, companies in a variety of industries will seek the similar exemptions.
The potential of Proposition 22’s vision of work extends “‘from
125
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agriculture to zookeeping . . . [to] nursing, executive assistance, tutoring,
programming, restaurant work, and design.’”134
Lastly, Proposition 22 has protected itself from attack because the
legislation preempts local laws and requires a seven–eighths supermajority
by the state legislature to make any changes.135 Requiring a seven–eighths
supermajority is stringent. Requiring a supermajority to amend the
legislation makes it nearly impossible to amend the legislation due to
plethora of lobbying that app–based driving companies can assert. As
aforementioned, $200 million dollars was the initial campaign investment
for lobbying Proposition 22.136 Moreover, Proposition 22, having a
preemption of local law clause, undercuts a feasible method that could
have circumvented the stringent supermajority requirement. Given that the
ballot measure was recently approved, any legislative amendments to
assist gig economy workers seams wholly infeasible for the near future.

ii. Advantage for Workers
Nonetheless, the inconsequential benefits that independent contractors
now have access to are somewhat advantageous because, before this
legislation, they were denied any protections. That being said, the
minimum earnings guarantee of 120% is tied to either the local or
statewide minimum wage, however, it is only applicable on the time spent
on rides.137 Moreover, the healthcare subsidy is based on a sliding scale
where workers will receive a stipend when they work at least fifteen hours
and this stipend will increase for those who work more than 25 hours per
week.138 These provisions, coupled with accident insurance and workplace
protections against discrimination and sexual harassment, are
advantageous to app–based drivers because the financial burden has
partially shifted to the app–based company.
Ultimately, Proposition 22 does not strike a balance between
companies and workers because it perpetuates the disadvantages of gig
workers from a public interest perspective. An app–based driver does not
come close to having similar protections as their traditional employee
counterpart. Thus, this legislation, although it appears as a compromise,
prioritizes app–based companies more, and, as such, is not an effective
solution to address the gig economy workers and their classification.
134
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PROPOSAL

The current legislation regarding gig workers employment
classification is inadequate. State legislation deliberately designating
transportation network company drivers as independent contractors,
coupled with transportation network companies launching initiatives
pushing towards exemption of its workers from applicable wage and hour
laws, has not resulted in a stable rule for transportation network company
workers’ classification. As a result, the legislation is consistently being
challenged as a misclassification of employment status. Ultimately, a
model approach is proposed—federal legislation comprised of an ABC
test. A federally designated ABC test is the optimal approach to the
transportation network company worker classification because it will
produce a rule that is uniform, stable, and feasible.
The federal ABC test will reinvigorate the ABC test set forth in the
Dynamex decision. The federal ABC test will be an element–based test
consisting of three prongs. It will begin with the common presumption that
“firms employ workers whom they hire.”139 The first element evaluates
whether the individual exerts labor subject to a firms’ retained control.140
The second element evaluates whether the designated individuals work
within a firms’ usual course of business.141 The third element evaluates
whether workers operate their own separate business.142 It will encompass
much of the Fair Labor Standards Act; specifically, entitling gig workers
to the same benefits and protections as their traditional employee
counterpart, namely: minimum wage laws, overtime pay laws, paid family
and medical leave policies, workers’ compensation coverage,
unemployment insurance, Title VII protection, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration protection, coverage under the Family Medical
Leave Act, workers compensation laws coverage, statute unemployment
insurance coverage, and federal paid sick leave. Moreover, it will
strengthen the existing ABC test in the Fair Labor Standards Act to the
aforementioned three–pronged Dynamex rule.
The federal ABC test will be one test that applies to all employment
classification disputes, specifically, wage and hour laws. Currently,
twenty–seven states use the ABC test for employment classifications,
however, their standards vary state by state.143 This variation has served as
one of the many impetus’s for misclassification litigation. A federally
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designated ABC test will produce uniformity because it will be a single
legislation that is applicable to all states, thereby precluding any variation.
The federal ABC test will be an elements–based test, versus a
balancing test, to minimize judicial discretion, and produce a stable rule
for gig workers engaged in transportation network companies. An
elements based–test will preclude judicial and legislative discretion
because it will prescribe the employee/employer classification to any type
of worker that meets at least one element.144 In this manner, a platform
company “cannot classify its workers as independent contractors if it fails
to prove any part of the test.”145 Moreover, the elements–based test
expressly enables the judge to not consider the indeterminate control
analysis or engage in balancing reasoning.146
The federal ABC test will also be its own separate legislation, targeted
to transportation network companies, to ensure feasibility. A federal ABC
test is feasible, because, in applying the Dynamex ABC test to recent
misclassification decisions, this standard “provides a more effective
mechanism for scrutinizing the nonemployee designations of gig
workers.”147 For instance, in Razak, Uber successfully persuaded the court
that its UberBLACK drivers were independent contractors who were not
entitled to overtime.148 The court in Razak applied the economic realities
test, which focused on the drivers’ apparent entrepreneurship. 149 They
reasoned that because plaintiffs operated their own companies, had the
ability to hire additional drivers to this company, some paid for
advertising, and they were free to provide rides to customers without the
Uber application, that these drivers resembled independent business
people and thus, precluded from collecting overtime.150 If, however, the
court had applied the Dynamex ABC test, the decision would have (1)
evaluated the varying levels of entrepreneurship that actually existed and
(2) addressed the question of “whether the drivers’ work fell within Uber’s
usual course of business.”151 In applying the Dynamex ABC test, the court
would have acknowledged that (1) only some plaintiffs hired other drivers,
(2) not all plaintiffs drove for other competitors, and (3) many plaintiffs
earned all of their income from Uber in certain years, suggesting that the
drivers did not have an apparent entrepreneurship.152 The court in Razak
144
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did acknowledge that these drivers are as essential part of Uber’s business,
however, this played an inconsequential role in the analysis. Whereas, in
applying the Dynamex ABC test, this classification dispute would be
neatly resolved because the court would have determined that
UberBLACK drivers do work within the firms’ usual course of business,
and in actuality, were not independent business owners since most of their
income was in fact derived from Uber.

A.

Counterarguments to the Proposed Legislation

This legislation is different than the already proposed Worker
Flexibility and Small Business Protection Plan for several strategic
reasons. First, because it does not propose to amend the Fair Labor
Standards Act. It will be unequivocally more difficult to garner support to
amend an existing bill that is decades old than it would be to craft a new
legislation. Second, because this proposed federal ABC test will have an
immediate effect by focusing specifically on transportation network
companies first, namely Uber, Lyft, Postmates, DoorDash, and the
remaining transportation network companies first. After there has been a
trial period of its effectiveness, then the legislation can begin to absorb
other categories of the modern gig economy with a sliding scale approach.
Critics of this approach, undoubtedly, assert that gig workers perform
functions that are outside of the firms’ ordinary course of business, and, as
such, should not be held out to be employees under the ABC test.153
Particularly, transportation network companies hold themselves out to be
technology companies, rather than service providers. For example, Uber
argues that it is a technology company and that those individuals that work
with Uber are engaging in transportation of passengers, which is a service,
and thus, the workers are performing a function outside of the firms’
ordinary course of business and not advancing the platforms primary
mission. However, any strategy “that requires platforms to argue against
their own brands is unlikely to yield long–term success.”154
Moreover, the Dynamex decision already provides clarity on the
argument. In Dynamex, the California Supreme Court referred to this
second prong of the ABC test as a firms’ “‘usual course of business,’” and
“not its primary brand.”155 The Dynamex court created the distinction
between an outside plumber being hired as an independent contractor
because the plumber does not work within the usual course of this
business. As such, the independent contractor designation is limited to a
nonemployee that “performs outside, isolated jobs on a very limited
153
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basis.”156 This distinction separates companies that hire individuals to
perform tasks that “occur regularly and indefinitely as part of the firm’s
normal business activities” because they are engaging in usual forms of
company work.157 Essentially, this distinction serves to include
transportation network company workers as employees because
transportation of passengers is with the firms’ normal business activities.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, evaluation of existing approaches to the gig economy
employment status through state legislation of transportation network
companies reveals that the gig economy employment classification is
inadequate because it has not resulted in a stable rule for transportation
network company workers’ classification. A new proposal—a federal
ABC test targeted at transportation network companies—is the most
pragmatic approach to transportation network company workers
employment classification because it produces a rule that is uniform,
stable, and feasible.
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